Hacked Event Broadcast

BeatXswap’s LiquidityVestingConvert used the Uniswap/Pancake V3 slot0() spot price as its only oracle, with no TWAP or deviation checks. An attacker flash-loaned 6,000,000 BTX, dumped it to crash the pool price, then called deposit() twice (10,000 + 2,000 USDT) to mint LP at the manipulated quote and drain 2,984,557 BTX (~$77,512).

An attacker exploited a bug in Nomic’s custom forwarding mechanism to double-spend nBTC and send unbacked vouchers to Osmosis. Osmosis and IBC themselves were not compromised. 39.84 nBTC of the minted supply sat in Alloyed BTC (~36% of its backing). Osmosis froze Nomic and Alloyed BTC flows, upgraded with validators, and froze 22.65 BTC in the attacker’s address. Governance will be asked to seize those funds and cover the rest from the community pool.

On September 9, 2026, an attacker used a single transaction on Citrea mainnet and ~200,000 USDC.e of flash liquidity as temporary collateral to drain 140,000 ctUSD and 30 USDC.e from Zentra’s lending pool. The root cause was an accounting edge case in repayWithATokens: the debt path could complete while the matching aToken burn was reduced to zero. The operations multisig paused all markets about 17 minutes later; no second exploit occurred.

The WealthManagementV2 contract lost funds after owner privileges were suspected of being illegally transferred (possibly due to a leaked private key). The attacker-controlled owner instantly set extreme plan parameters (period=0, interestMultiplier/unlockMultiplier=528,300,000) via updatePlanConfig with no timelock or bounds, minted inflated interest by investing and redeeming in the same transaction, then unlocked and withdrew the funds via a second investment, resulting in a loss of 26,414 USDT.

DeFi protection protocol Cozy Finance on Optimism was exploited for about $160,000. The attacker first bought PTokens in the Aave v2 and Curve protection markets, then submitted undisputed YES answers to the UMA Optimistic Oracle. The trigger did not independently verify a real Aave/Curve hack, and PToken payout eligibility was not tied to a pre-proposal holder snapshot. After the markets moved to TRIGGERED, the attacker burned PTokens and claimed USDC.

An unnamed DEX router on BNB Chain was exploited because uniswapV3SwapCallback did not authenticate a real V3 pool. The attacker used a fake pool, set victims as payer, and drained existing token allowances via transferFrom, stealing about 62.28 WBNB from 29 wallets in one transaction.

Bitcoin sidechain Liquid Network was exploited via an Elements range-proof verification cache bug, allowing creation of about 4,000 unbacked LBTC. The actor then used SideSwap’s standard peg-out path to withdraw about 4,000 BTC ($320,000,000) from the federation reserve. Liquid said no private keys were compromised. The actor, claiming to be a white hat, returned 3,400 BTC on September 7 and still holds about 598.5 BTC ($47,000,000). The network remains paused.

Dream Health Chain’s staking/reward contracts on BSC were exploited for about 71,851 USDT. A broken award state machine allowed a claimed reward to be reset with a tiny or zero-effective DHC deposit, so the same fixed payout could be claimed repeatedly from the shared pool. The attacker looped pledge and claim, then sold about 542,070 DHC into the DHC-USDT pool.

Reddio’s RedSonic Vault on Ethereum was exploited for about 9.25 ETH (~$22,800). After permissionlessly registering an stETH vault, the same stETH was counted in both the ETH vault and the stETH vault. The attacker used a flash loan to inflate the rsvETH share price, redeemed excess ETH, then redeemed rsvstETH to recover the same stETH.

An attacker exploited a dormant, illiquid perpetual market on Rocket. Using a burner account, they posted orders at artificially inflated prices and traded against themselves to generate fake profits on one account while bankrupting the burner. The profitable account then withdrew approximately $287K in positive PnL from the Bridge, with the loss socialized across the platform. Deposits, withdrawals and trading were paused.

Secured Finance’s fixed-rate lending protocol was exploited via an order-book accounting flaw that treated unfilled orders as filled and created invalid balances. Attackers used flash loans and self-trades to manipulate the current-block price and withdraw funds. Markets on Ethereum, Arbitrum, and Filecoin were paused. The team’s preliminary loss estimate is about $180,000; no recovery has been confirmed.

Notional Finance’s legacy V1 Escrow contract was exploited. The attacker abused an unsafe uint128 cast in free-collateral valuation so that a fabricated liability of about 2^128 truncated to zero, bypassing solvency checks, minting fake fCash claims, and withdrawing about 69,257.37 DAI and 1,658,524.86 USDC (~$1.73M). The funds were swapped into roughly 689.2 ETH and deposited into Tornado Cash. The team paused the affected contract, said other user assets were not at risk, and is pursuing recovery.

On the evening of September 3, 2026, approximately 4,011 XRPH Wallet user accounts suffered unauthorized transactions involving XRPH, XRPHAI and other assets, with roughly $452,000 stolen. Funds were collected, bridged via NEAR Intents to Ethereum, and converted to about 445,198 DAI, which remains unmoved in one address. The project confirmed no issue with the XRP Ledger itself, took the app offline, and is investigating.

The GebProxyActions contract was exploited due to missing caller access control in the quitSystem function. Victims had previously called it directly instead of via DSProxy delegatecall, setting ownsSAFE[safe] to the GebProxyActions contract. The attacker called GebProxyActions.quitSystem(manager, safe, dst) directly, bypassing GebSafeManager’s safeAllowed check and transferring collateral to themselves.

An attacker exploited a vulnerability in Ankr’s ankrFLOW liquid staking contract to mint approximately 8.6 million unbacked ankrFLOW tokens, then used them as collateral with More Markets’ E-mode to drain about 15.5 million WFLOW (~$410,000 at spot) from the lending reserve. The attacker realized roughly $246,000 after slippage. The Flow Foundation stated the root cause was in Ankr’s Solidity contract, not Flow EVM or More Markets.

Solana-based proprietary AMM Aquifer was exploited for about $2.5 million. Public reporting points to compromised protocol-linked wallets or admin credentials rather than a confirmed smart-contract bug. The attacker operated addresses on both Solana and Ethereum. The same day, Aquifer’s Solana upgrade authority posted an on-chain white-hat offer: return at least 80% of stolen assets by September 3, 2026, 14:00 UTC to designated recovery addresses, and keep up to 20% as a bounty, in exchange for no civil claims by the project.

An attacker exploited a rounding/precision vulnerability in legacy Balancer V1 contracts. Using flash loans to compress WBTC reserves to near-zero, they minted a large amount of BPT with only 1 satoshi of WBTC and then proportionally exited to drain DPI, USDC, WETH and WBTC from the pool.

An attacker used a flash loan to execute large swaps on a Uniswap V3 pool and manipulate the spot price (slot0). This caused Float Protocol’s Hypervisor contracts to misprice LP shares. Because critical functions lacked TWAP/oracle validation and slippage protection, the attacker repeatedly deposited and withdrew at inflated share values, extracting about $28,000 (10.71 ETH).

On August 30, 2026, an attacker looped borrowing and re-supplying Tectonic’s governance token TONIC as collateral while manipulating its price by ~195x, then borrowed about $120.4 million from multiple Tectonic lending markets in one transaction. Cronos halted and rolled back the chain, restoring on-chain assets to the pre-exploit state; approximately $9.19 million that left Cronos before the halt remains unrecovered. Supply and borrow remain paused.

The Fogo Foundation experienced a compromise by an unknown actor, resulting in 400 million FOGO tokens being sent to a bad actor. The Foundation immediately alerted exchanges, law enforcement, and forensic experts. Initially stated no impact on the blockchain, but later halted the mainnet as a precaution to restrict associated addresses and prevent further asset movement. Mainnet was later restarted after recovering and permanently removing 237 million tokens.